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Statutes
Utah Code Ann. section 62A-12-204 (1988 Cumulative Supplement,
replacement volume 7A, Part I ) :
(2) The state hospital is authorized to
receive from any other institution within the
department any person committed to that
institution, when a careful evaluation of the
treatment needs of that person and of the
treatment programs available at the state
hospital indicates that the transfer would be
in the interest of that person.
(3) The state hospital is required to
receive any person committed to the state
prison when ordered by the executive director
of the department. In making that
determination, the executive director shall
consider the treatment needs of that person
and the treatment programs available at the
state hospital. Any person so transferred to
the state hospital shall remain under the
jurisdiction of the state prison or such
other institution, and the state hospital
shall act solely as the agent of the state
prison or such other institution.
Utah Code Ann. section 64-7-36(10) (Volume 7A, Part II, 1986
replacement volume):
(10) The court shall order hospitalization
if, upon completion of the hearing and
consideration of the record, the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The proposed patient has a mental
illness; and
(b) Because of the patient's illness the
proposed patient poses an immediate danger of
physical injury to others or self, which may
include the inability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food, clothing,
and shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty;
and
(c) The patient lacks the ability to
engage in a rational decision-making process
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment
as demonstrated by evidence of inability to
weigh the possible costs and benefits of
treatment; and
(d) There is no appropriate less
restrictive alternative to a court order of
hospitalization; and
iii.

(e) The hospital or mental health
facility in which the individual is to be
hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide
the individual with treatment that is
adequate and appropriate to the individual•s
conditions and needs....
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305 (replacement volume 8B, 1988
cumulative supplement):
....

(4) "Mental illness" means a mental
disease or defect. A mental defect may be a
congenital condition or one the result of
injury or a residual effect of a physical or
mental disease. Mental illness does not mean
a personality or character disorder or
abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5 (replacement volume 8C, 1988
cumulative supplement):
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally
ill being tendered by a defendant to any
charge, the court shall hold a hearing within
a reasonable time to determine the claim of
mental illness of the defendant. Mental
illness, for this purpose, is determined by
the definition stated in Subsection 76-2305(4). The court may order the defendant to
be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or
any other suitable facility, and may receive
the evidence of any private or public expert
witness whose evidence is offered by the
defendant or the prosecutor. A defendant who
tenders a plea of "guilty and mentally ill"
shall be examined first by the trial judge in
compliance with the standards for taking
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be
advised that a plea of guilty and mentally
ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent
plea. If the defendant is later found not to
be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise
lawfully made remains a valid plea of guilty
and the defendant shall be sentenced as any
other offender. If the court concludes that
the defendant is currently mentally ill,
applying the standards set forth in this
section, the defendant's plea shall be
accepted and he shall be sentenced as a
mentally ill offender. Expenses of
examination, observation, or treatment,
excluding travel to and from any mental
health facility, shall be charged to the
iv .

county, except when the offense is a state
offense, the state shall pay part of all of
the expense where the Legislature has
expressly appropriated money for this
purpose. Travel expenses shall be charged to
the county in which prosecution is
commenced. Examination of defendants charged
with municipal or county ordinance violations
shall be charged to the municipality or
county commencing the prosecution.
....

(3) If the defendant is found guilty and
mentally ill, the court shall impose any
sentence which could be imposed under law
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same
offense. Before sentencing, the court shall
conduct a hearing to determine the
defendant's present mental status.
(4) The court shall in its sentence
order hospitalization at the Utah State
Hospital or other suitable facility if, upon
completion of the hearing and consideration
of the record, the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(a) the defendant has a mental
illness as defined by Subsection
76-2-305(4);
(b) because of his mental
illness the defendant poses an
immediate physical danger to others
or self, which may include
jeopardizing his own or others'
safety, health, or welfare if
placed in a correctional or
probation setting, or lacks the
ability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, if placed on
probation;
(c) the defendant lacks the
ability to engage in a rational
decision-making process regarding
the acceptance of mental treatment
as demonstrated by evidence of
inability to weigh the possible
costs and benefits of treatment;
(d) there is no appropriate
treatment alternative to a court
order of hospitalization; and
(e) the Utah State Hospital or
other suitable facility can provide
the defendant with treatment, care,
and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's
v•

conditions and needs.
(8) When the Utah State Hospital or
other suitable facility proposes to discharge
a defendant prior to the expiration of
sentence, the institution shall transmit to
the Board of Pardons a report on the
condition of the defendant, including the
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of
treatment, the prognosis for the remission of
symptoms, the potential for recidivism and
for the danger to himself and the public, and
the recommendations for future treatment.
The Board of Pardons shall direct that the
defendant serve any or all of the unexpired
term of the sentence at the Utah State
Prison, or place the defendant on parole. If
the Board of Pardon's pursuant to law or
administrative rules, considers for parole
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty
and mentally ill, the board shall consult
with the treating facility or agency and an
additional report on the condition of the
defendant may be filed with the board.
Pending action of the board, the defendant
shall remain at the institution at which he
is hospitalized. If the defendant is placed
on parole, treatment shall, upon the
recommendation of the hospital facility, be
made a condition of parole, and failure to
continue treatment or other condition of
parole except by agreement with the
designated facility and the Board of Pardons
is a basis for initiating parole violation
hearings. The period of parole may not be
for fewer than five years or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence,
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced
without consideration by the Board of Pardons
of a current report on the mental health
status of the offender.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880257
Priority No. 2

RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues,
the case, and the facts, and the summary of the argument.
Appellant responds to the State's answer to the opening brief as
follows:
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SUBSECTION (b) OF UTAH CODE ANN.
SECTION 77-35-21.5(4), AND SHOULD
CONCLUDE THAT THE APPLICATION OF THAT
SUBSECTION IN THIS CASE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.
A. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS.
The State notes that Appellant did not raise the
constitutionality of subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 771
35-21.5 in the lower court, and asks this Court to decide this
(b) because of his mental illness the
defendant poses an immediate physical danger
to others or self, which may include
jeopardizing his own or others' safety,
health, or welfare if placed in a
correctional or probation setting, or lacks
the ability to provide the basic necessities
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter,
1

issue raised on appeal on waiver grounds, without reaching the
2
merits.
While Appellant recognizes that valid interests
3
protected by the contemporaneous objection rule, Appellant
requests that this Court address the constitutionality of
subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5,
notwithstanding the fact that the issue was not addressed in the
lower court.
The possibility of improper sentencing and treatment of
the mentally ill offenders in Utah, resulting from an unworkable
statute governing the sentencing and treatment of those people,
is reason enough to permit an exception to the contemporaneous
4
objection rule in this case.
Further, the inconsistencies in
the trial court's findings and between some of the findings and
the court's recommendation to the Board of Pardons and Paroles
demonstrate that the court should have recognized that
subsection (b) cannot be applied iii this case in a rational
if placed on probation;
2

Respondent's brief, 13-14.

3

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d) provides:
Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses
or objections or to make requests which must be made
prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause
shown may grant relief from such waiver.
4
See State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 287-290
(1988)(separate opinions of Justice Stewart, Durham, and
Zimmerman, recognizing the exceptional problems caused by
ignoring the need for adequate legislation concerning the
treatment of mentally ill and mentally retarded people in the
criminal justice system).
2

manner.

The result of the court's failure to strike that factor

from its consideration is that Appellant was sentenced to prison
instead of to the Utah State Hospital, where he is statutorily
entitled to treatment for his mental illnesses.

Accordingly,

this Court should address the constitutionality of subsection
(b), because the trial court's failure to do so constituted plain
error.

See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah

1989)(discussing the plain error doctrine).

Alternatively, this

Court should address the constitutionality of subsection (b) to
guide the courts in the application of section 77-35-21.5.
B. THE APPLICATION OF SUBSECTION (b) IN THIS CASE VIOLATED DUE
PROCESS.
The State argues that the standard of evaluation of the
constitutionality of subsection (b) should be one of "fairness",
characterizing the issue raised here as one of procedural due
6
process.
Appellant is not arguing that there has been a lack of
procedure in this case.

Rather, his argument is that the

substance of subsection (b) is irrational.

Hence, the

substantive due process analysis and arbitrary and capricious
test utilized by this Court in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266
(Utah 1988) are proper tools in this case.
Seeking to uphold the constitutionality of subsection
5
See State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271-1272 (Utah
1988), and the appellate briefs in that case (number 860491),
which demonstrate that this Court may choose to address sua
sponte the constitutionality of the statute governing the
treatment of the mentally ill.
6

Respondent's brief at 14.
3

(b) # the State characterizes the proof of dangerousness
requirement as a procedural benefit to the defendant, because it
requires the sentencing court to tailor the defendant's sentence
7
to him according to his individual circumstances.
While
individualized sentencing is a laudable goal, the goal is not met
in the context of treatment of mentally ill offenders through the
application of the dangerousness prerequisite to treatment,
which, if proved, might be construed as calling for
8
imprisonment.
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), this
Court recognized the two goals of section 77-35-21.5:
"defendant's right to treatment and society's right to protection
against a potentially dangerous individual".

_Id. at 1271.

The

language of subsection (b), which requires a showing of
dangerousness of the defendant to himself or others as a
prerequisite to treatment for mental illness, seeks to limit the
class of defendants eligible for treatment, thus working against
the "defendant's right to treatment" interest asserted by the
statute.

Requiring a showing of dangerousness as a prerequisite

to treatment also disserves the second interest asserted by the
statute, "society's right to protection against a dangerous
individual".
7

While requiring a showing of dangerousness prior to

Respondent's brief at 15-17.

8
See Respondent's brief at 30, noting that "[T]he
evidence clearly establishes that the Utah State Hospital could
not provide him with needed treatment, and defendant posed a
security risk if sentenced to that institution."
4

h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n furthers the state interest of preser \ ing a
person's liberty in the civil commitment c o n t e x t , In the context
of i; reaf-J n< f mental hv

i | | criminal d e f e n d a n t s , w h e r e there is no

liberty interest to be protected, requiring a showing of
dangerousness defeats the interests of the s t a t u t e .
Pai: t i ci :iJ ai: J ;;; i f t: 1 I:! s Coi :ii: t: :::ondones the trial court's
actions in considering the dangers posed by Appellant in
assessing the ability of the State Hospital to treat A p p e l l a n t ,
l.ln

I uiiLjiiacjC

in t.ijbseci j on (l>) inquiring a showing of

dangerousness as a prerequisite to treatment is nonsensical in
this c a s e .
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING
A P P E L L A N T TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON.
T h e t r ^ a i court's misinterpretation of section 76-2-305(4) was
not harmless error.

A<>

Utah Code A n n . section 76-2-305 defines mental i l l n e s s :
• •• •

VT:/ "Mental illness" means a mental
disease or d e f e c t . A mental defect m a y be a
congenital condition or one the result of
injury or a residual effect of a physical or
mental d i s e a s e . Mental illness does not
m e a n a personality or character disorder or
abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal c o n d u c t .
The State concedes that the phrase "manifested only by repeated

9
See pages 3 and 4 of the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law; State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Utah
1988)("If neither the hospital nor any other facility can
provide 'treatment, care and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and n e e d s , ' placement
in such a facility m a y not be justified because of the additional
security burdens it would i m p o s e . " ) ,
5

criminal conduct" modifies personality and character disorders,
as well as abnormalities.10

However, the language of the trial

court's findings of facts and conclusions of law support
Appellant's assertion, which is not contested by the State, that
the trial court interpreted that section as excluding all
personality disorders from the definition of mental illness.
Paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reads
as follows:
The Court finds that the defendant has
several personality disorders and tends to
abuse drugs and alcohol, conditions which do
not constitute mental illness as defined by
Section 76-2-305(4).
The State argues that even if the court misinterpreted
76-2-305(4), the error was harmless because the court found
Appellant mentally ill by virtue of his mental retardation and
admitted evidence concerning all of Appellant's mental
illnesses. 11

Had the court recognized Appellant's personality

disorders as illnesses eligible for treatment, however, the
court's finding under subsection (e) of section 77-35-21.5, which
requires the court to determine if the Hospital can treat the
mental illnesses, would have supported sentencing Appellant to
the Hospital.

While the doctors from the State Hospital

disagreed with the court's finding that Appellant suffers from
the personality disorders (T. 83, 84, 104, 129), they testified
that the State Hospital is equipped to treat such disorders (T.
10
11

Respondent's brief at 22.
Respondent's Brief at 22-24.
6

87, 94, 133-134).
T h u s , unless this Court upholds the constitutionality
of subseet 11 HI (li)f uint i

• - m n s analysis of that

subsection and subsection

trial court's misunderstanding

of the definition o f mental illness could not have been harmless
error.
B. Appellant carried h i s burden under subsection
77-35-21.5.

of section

The State indicates that Appellant failt-

meet his

burden under subsection it • , because h e did n o t prove that the
dar. ;

•.•.:•:•

. mental illness, as opposed t o

his drug and alcohol a b u s e . *" Appellant's behavior p r o b l e m s ,
h o w e v e r , are causally related to h i s mental illnesses.
Appellant's int-alal i H ,i r < l<if i mi I'aust'h h i rii difficulty in judging
social reality, resulting ii i 1 i:i s engaging i n "very poor social
judgments" (T. 3 1 - 3 2 ) .

The anoxia incurred w h e n Appellant w a s

eighteen resulted 11 i orga i: i i c br a i n s> ndrome and the exaggeration
of h i s behavioral p r o b l e m s , and leads Appellant to "strike o u t "
and deal impulsively with h i s frustrations (R. 3 4 , 5 5 - 5 7 ) .
Appe 1 lant' s menta 1 retardati o n ,„ orgai I i c brain
personality disorders result in h i s inability
his need to obey others without thinking, h i s

others,
«v >ei:' esteem,

and h i s taking dr ugs I o a ] t er 1 low 1: ie £e< *] s ( T . '•'""- ) .
While there w a s evidence that alcohol and drugs are
causally related to Appellant's dangerousness, there w a s also

12

Respondent's brief at 2 5 .
7

evidence that his dangerousness is a result of his mental
illnesses.
The State indicates that there was insufficient proof
that Appellant is in danger in the prison as a result of his
mental illnesses, claiming that his inability to assert himself,
his inability to resist being led, and his being abused by others
(see defense exhibit 2) do not constitute a dangers worthy of
protection.

The language of subsection (b) is broad enough to

encompass these dangers.

It reads:

(b) because of his mental
illness the defendant poses an
immediate physical danger to others
or self, which may include
jeopardizing his own or others '
safety, health, or welfare if
placed in a correctional or
probation setting, or lacks the
ability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, if placed on
probation.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what dangers must be
posed to a mentally ill person in the prison in order to qualify
him for the protections afforded by section 77-35-21.5(b) if the
dangers posed to Appellant as a result of his mental illnesses
are insufficient.
C. This Court should clarify the definition of "treatment" under
subsection (e).
After lengthy and careful analysis, the State
determines that the legislature intended that mentally retarded

13

Respondent's brief at 26.
8

o f f e n d e r s q u a l i f y as "mentally i 1 1 " under s e c t i o n 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 1 . 5 .
A p p e l l a n t asks this C o u r t t o interpret s u b s e c t i o n (e) of section
77-35-2 J 5 j :: ' I i I a m a i i < *:i : i 1: Ia 1: !:<: ici 3 itates t he J egis3 ative desire
to p r o v i d e special t r e a t m e n t for m e n t a l l y retarded o f f e n d e r s .
See Sutherland, Statutory C o n s t r u c t i o n , 4th E d . 1 9 8 7 , section
46. 05f

"Whole S t a t u t e " Interpretatioi I ("!,:P. si a 1 ,i i1e :i s passed as a

w h o l e and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general
p u r p o s e and i n t e n t .

C o n s e q u e n t l y , each p a r t or section should be

c o n s 1: i: i :i e d I n c o n n e c t i o i i w i 11 i e \ e r y o t h e i: p a i: t o r s e c t i o n s o a s t o
produce a harmonious w h o l e . " ) .
The State correctly distinguishes Matter of Giles, 657
P.2d 285 (Utalt

Colyar v. Third Judicial District Court,

469 F.Supp. 424

1979) as cases dealing with civil

commitment.

Inasmuch as "treatment" I n the civi 1 commitment

context must be sufficiently appropr i «J t. v lu Hie patient ";. needs
to justify intruding on that person's liberty and privacy,
14

Respondent's Brief at 18-21.
While the terminology used by the legislature in this
statute may be "clinically offensive" in classifying mentally
retarded people as mentally ill, Appellant would note that there
is nothing offensive about the intended result of that
classification - the special treatment of mentally retarded
people. See State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 287-290
(1988)(separate opinions of Justice Stewart, Durham, and
Zimmerman, recognizing the legitimacy of special treatment of
mentally ill and mentally retarded people in the criminal justice
system).
15

(e) the Utah State Hospital or
other suitable facility can provide
the defendant with treatment, care,
and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's
conditions and needs.
9

perhaps in the context of treating mentally ill offenders who
have no liberty interest at stake, the definition of "treatment"
should be broader than it is in the civil commitment context.
Cf. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1272.
In support of Appellant's assertion that the dangers
posed by him should not be factored into the consideration of the
propriety of treatment at the State Hospital under subsection
(e), Appellant refers this Court to Senate Bill No. 59 (1989
general session), wherein the legislature created a Psychiatric
Security Review Board to oversee the treatment of mentally ill
offenders, and wherein treatment is repeatedly made contingent on
the danger posed by or to the mentally ill offender.

In the

event that this Court agrees with Appellant that the Utah
Legislature does not consider dangerousness to be a reason to
prevent a person from being in the State Hospital, 16 this Court
may choose to reinterpret the competing interests involved in
this context as the defendant's need for treatment and society's
unwillingness to pay for i t . 1 7
16
See also Utah Code Ann. sections 64-7-36 (civil
commitment of dangerous people), 62A-12-204(2) and (3)(requiring
State Hospital to accept "any" persons from other institutions
and from the prison after evaluation of the treatment needs of
those persons and the availability of treatment programs).
17

See Murphy v. State, 760 P.2d 280 (Utah 1988):
Finally, it is unfortunate, as Justice
Durham suggests, that the state has largely
ignored the problems presented by the fact
that a significant number of people entering
the criminal justice system suffer from
mental illness or retardation. While
mandatory incarceration and ever-longer
sentences are politically popular, spending
10

CONCLUSION
Appellant asks that this Court clarify Utah Code Ann.
section 7 7- 3 5 - 23 • 5 a n d remai id I :i :! s case fc r resentencing in
accordance with that statute and due
e process.
process.
Respectfully submitted this
i
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money to adequately house those confined,
much less treat those suffering from mental
problems, is not."
Id * at 290, Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion.
Alternately, this Court may choose to recognize that
"society's right to protection from a potentially dangerous
individual" succeeds when dangerous mentally ill offenders are
given treatment, rather than a term in prison where treatment may
not occur prior to release.
In these circumstances, the dangerousness criteria in
subsection (b) are rational because they would insure that the
most dangerous offenders are treated prior to their release into
society, and would limit the number of offenders eligible for
state financed treatment.
xl

